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HEMISPHERES APART,  
A PROFESSION CONNECTED 
Dana Remus* 
INTRODUCTION 
Social scientists have long recognized the bifurcated and stratified nature 
of the American legal profession.1  They describe a two-tiered profession:  
in the corporate hemisphere, high-status graduates of elite law schools 
overwhelmingly work in large law firms serving corporate clients;2 in the 
personal-services hemisphere, graduates of less prestigious, local law 
schools work in smaller firms and serve individual clients.3  In the past 
twenty years, legal scholars have built on this model in valuable ways.  
They have studied the distinct ethical challenges of lawyering in each 
hemisphere and offered normative proposals to address those challenges.4  
In drawing the two hemispheres apart, however, these scholars have 
overlooked the many links that tie them together. 
Initially, scholars proposed heightened client and public protections in 
particular contexts.5  Today, many scholars propose to relax professional 
regulation in just one hemisphere.  Some advocate a relaxation of 
unauthorized practice rules in the personal-services hemisphere to increase 
competition, decrease prices, and make legal services more accessible to all 
segments of the population.6  Others propose a relaxation of particular 
client protections in the corporate hemisphere to honor client autonomy and 
choice.7 
 
*  Associate Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law.  For insightful 
comments on prior drafts, I am grateful to Al Brophy, Bernie Burke, Elizabeth Chambliss, 
Bill Marshall, Mary Mitchell, Richard Myers, and Brad Wendel.  For excellent research 
assistance, I am grateful to Erin Locker and Troy Shelton. 
 1. In their 1975 study of Chicago lawyers, sociologists Jon Heinz and Edward 
Laumann theorized that most of the differentiation they observed within the legal profession 
turned on one fundamental distinction—the type of client. See JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD O. 
LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS:  THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (1982).  They therefore 
theorized that the legal profession consisted of two distinct hemispheres:  one serving 
corporate clients and one serving individuals. Id. at 127–75.  Subsequently, social scientists 
(including Heinz and Laumann themselves) built upon this framework in many important 
ways, documenting the growing distance between the two hemispheres, and studied the 
different norms, cultures, and practices of lawyers working in each. See infra notes 15–26 
and accompanying text. 
 2. See HEINZ & LAUMANN, supra note 1, at 192–93. 
 3. Id. at 193. 
 4. See infra notes 30–34 and accompanying text. 
 5. See infra notes 27–29 and accompanying text. 
 6. See infra notes 30–34 and accompanying text. 
 7. See infra notes 36–37 and accompanying text. 
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In this Article, I explore the unintended consequences of these proposals.  
I argue that although scholars advocating the two sets of changes have 
distinct goals and motivations, their proposals suffer from a common 
flaw—they fail to account for the extent and significance of links that 
connect the profession’s two hemispheres.  These links are forged through 
lawyers’ common training and socialization, and common responsibility for 
the fairness and integrity of our legal system.  They are also forged in a less 
recognized way—through countless daily interactions, ranging from basic 
consumer contracts to full-blown legal disputes, between clients of the two 
hemispheres.  Drawing on these interactions, I argue that proposals to relax 
regulation along the profession’s existing structural contours threaten to 
exaggerate and entrench wealth and power disparities in the profession and 
in society at large. 
In Part I, I review both the social science literature that documents the 
profession’s bifurcated structure and the legal scholarship that incorporates 
that bifurcated structure into proposals for context-specific regulation.  I 
focus on recent proposals to loosen client protections in each hemisphere.  
In Part II, I argue that relaxing ethical standards in either hemisphere would 
have troubling system-wide ramifications.  In the personal-services 
hemisphere, it would threaten to depress the quality of available legal 
services and to place individual clients at an even greater disadvantage vis-
à-vis repeat-player corporate clients.  In the corporate hemisphere, it would 
undermine professional independence and could allow corporate clients to 
use their lawyers to achieve aggressive and unethical ends.  In both cases, 
relaxing ethical standards would threaten to exacerbate existing structural 
inequalities. 
I conclude in Part III by suggesting that legal ethics scholars have an 
obligation to acknowledge and address the inequities that inhere in many 
interactions between the clients of the profession’s two hemispheres.  
Rather than drawing these hemispheres apart, scholars should be accounting 
for their interconnectedness.  We should do so by thinking creatively about 
a broader range of regulatory reforms than are currently under 
consideration—reforms that can expand the provision of competent legal 
services to a broader range of clients while strengthening the profession’s 
independence from corporate clients. 
I.  THE STRATIFICATION OF THE PROFESSION 
The structural division of lawyers into two distinct hemispheres is now 
widely accepted by scholars of the legal profession.  But when John Heinz 
and Edward Laumann published Chicago Lawyers in 1982, the hemispheres 
theory was groundbreaking.  I begin this Part by reviewing their initial 
study, their follow-up study twenty years later, and subsequent social 
science work building on their framework.  I then turn to the normative and 
prescriptive work of legal scholars who propose a loosening of professional 
regulation to address salient problems in each of the profession’s 
hemispheres.  These include the need for increased access to quality 
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lawyering in the personal-services hemisphere and increased professional 
independence in the corporate hemisphere. 
A.  Social Science Literature 
In 1975, Heinz and Laumann conducted face-to-face interviews with a 
random sample of 777 Chicago attorneys, who spanned a variety of practice 
areas and career stages.8  Based on their findings, they concluded that most 
of the differentiation within the legal profession—between lawyers’ 
backgrounds, training, incomes, and work life—turned on one fundamental 
distinction—the type of client being served.9  They observed that most 
lawyers serving corporations and other large organizations were members 
of high-status families and graduates of elite law schools, who worked in 
large, high-status firms.10  Lawyers who primarily served individuals, in 
contrast, tended to come from lower socioeconomic backgrounds and to be 
graduates of local law schools.11  Overwhelmingly, they worked as solo 
practitioners or in small law firms.  Many were racial or ethnic minorities.12  
Heinz and Laumann theorized that based on the different client bases, the 
late twentieth-century profession was stratified into a corporate hemisphere 
and a distinct personal-services hemisphere.13  Observing that practice in 
the corporate as opposed to personal-services hemisphere dictated higher 
salaries, greater prestige, and increased job security, they concluded that the 
profession’s bifurcated structure reinforced the class distinctions it 
reflected.14 
In the decades following the 1970s, the profession’s hemispheres grew 
farther apart while fragmenting within.  When Heinz, Laumann, and two 
new collaborators updated their study in the late 1990s,15 they concluded 
that, notwithstanding significant changes in the market for legal services 
(including declining racial, ethnic, and gender discrimination),16 the divide 
between the two classes of clients had endured.17  They observed that the 
lawyers serving each type of client continued to come from significantly 
different backgrounds and that socioeconomic status continued to be the 
 
 8. HEINZ & LAUMANN, supra note 1, at 10–13. 
 9. Id. at 320 (“Though there certainly are distinctions among lawyers that cut across the 
line between the two broad classes of clients, this fundamental difference in the nature of the 
client served appears to be the principal factor that structures the social differentiation of the 
profession.”). 
 10. Id. at 187–93. 
 11. Id. at 133–34, 193. 
 12. Id. at 127, 158–59. 
 13. Id. at 319. 
 14. Id. at 196–97, 373–79. 
 15. JOHN P. HEINZ ET AL., URBAN LAWYERS:  THE NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 
(2005). 
 16. Among other things, they observed that women and minorities were better 
represented in the profession, id. at 20–23, and that ethnoreligious background had fallen 
away as a determinant of law school and career path, id. at 60–62.  But the new groups 
entering the profession were largely excluded from the large-law corporate law firms of the 
corporate hemisphere. Id. at 72–73. 
 17. Id. at 7. 
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critical differentiator.18  Even more so than before, lawyers serving 
corporate entities were rewarded with significantly higher levels of income, 
wealth, and prestige than lawyers serving individuals.  Observing that the 
lawyers of the corporate hemisphere took home a disproportionately high 
percentage of lawyers’ overall earnings, Heinz and his co-collaborators 
concluded that the term “hemispheres,” suggesting equal sizes, had become 
somewhat misleading.19 
They also observed that legal practice had become more specialized 
within each hemisphere, and particularly within the corporate hemisphere.20  
Whereas many lawyers had once been generalists, providing full-service 
practices, Heinz and his collaborators observed an increasing number of 
corporate lawyers who chose a specific practice area early in their careers.  
This, in turn, pushed the two hemispheres ever further apart.  It led many 
large firms to “shed the smaller clients and full service practices that 
previously allowed them to dabble in work that more closely resembled the 
work done by their brethren in the personal plight hemisphere of the bar.”21  
Large firms sought to perform only “premium work for premium clients,”22 
bringing in greater revenues and further increasing the income and wealth 
inequities between hemispheres. 
In recent years, sociologists of the legal profession have built on Heinz 
and Laumann’s work in a number of ways.  Some have studied the cultures, 
pressures, and practices of particular practice areas within each 
hemisphere.23  Others have continued to study profession-wide trends using 
 
 18. They found that socioeconomic status, as measured by father’s occupation, remained 
a reliable predictor of law school attended, and law school attended remained the critical 
gatekeeper to the more lucrative world of corporate practice. See id. at 58 tbl.3.1; see also id. 
at 66–67 (“Given the correlation between father’s occupation and type of law school 
attended, and the further relationship between law school and practice context, income, and 
the likelihood of partnership, we should expect there to be a strong relationship between 
social background and the hierarchy of career opportunities in the legal profession.”); 
Rebecca L. Sandefur, Staying Power:  The Persistence of Social Inequality in Shaping 
Lawyer Stratification and Lawyers’ Persistence in the Profession, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 539, 
543 (2007) (“While the profession opened up to women and racial minorities, it did not see 
an increasing representation of the children of the non-professional classes.  Lawyers whose 
fathers had worked in professional or technical occupations composed 32% of the practicing 
Chicago bar in 1975 and 57% in 1995.”). 
 19. John P. Heinz et al., The Changing Character of Lawyers’ Work:  Chicago in 1975 
and 1995, 32 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 751, 766–67 (1998). 
 20. Id. at 37. 
 21. David Wilkins, Some Realism about Legal Realism for Lawyers, in LAWYERS IN 
PRACTICE:  ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN CONTEXT 29–30 (Leslie C. Levin & Lynn Mather 
eds., 2012). 
 22. Id. 
 23. See, e.g., MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS:  THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM (1991); LYNN MATHER, CRAIG A. MCEWEN & 
RICHARD J. MAIMAN, DIVORCE LAWYERS AT WORK:  VARIETIES OF PROFESSIONALISM IN 
PRACTICE (2001); MILTON C. REGAN JR., EAT WHAT YOU KILL:  THE FALL OF A WALL 
STREET LAWYER (2004); Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, “The Impact That It Has Had Is 
Between People’s Ears”: Tort Reform, Mass Culture, and Plaintiffs’ Lawyers, 50 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 453 (2000); Herbert M. Kritzer, The Fracturing Legal Profession:  The Case of 
Plaintiffs’ Personal Injury Lawyers, 8 INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 225 (2001). 
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data from the American Bar Foundation’s After the JD study.24  
Overwhelmingly, they have concluded that while overt discrimination 
based on gender, race, and religion has significantly decreased within the 
legal profession,25 socioeconomic status continues to play a determinative 
role in many lawyers’ career paths.26  Accordingly, the stratified structure 
of the legal profession continues to mirror the stratification of society at 
large. 
B.  Legal Literature 
Like their colleagues in social science departments, legal scholars 
studying the profession have long appreciated and built upon Heinz and 
Laumann’s work.  In a series of seminal articles in the early 1990s, David 
Wilkins critiqued the profession’s singular and unified regulatory model for 
failing to address the existence of, and differentiation between, the 
profession’s hemispheres.27  Citing the varied realities of legal practice 
described by Heinz, Laumann, and others, he advocated a system of 
“middle-level rules” to address the different work and ethical challenges of 
different lawyering contexts.28  Many legal ethicists agreed.  Following 
 
 24. RONIT DINOVITZER ET AL., AFTER THE JD:  FIRST RESULTS OF A NATIONAL STUDY OF 
LEGAL CAREERS (2004).  The After the JD study (AJD), a national longitudinal survey of law 
graduates administered by the American Bar Foundation, is based on a representative sample 
of 4,000 lawyers who graduated from law school between June 1998 and July 2000 and were 
admitted to the bar in 2000. Id. at 14.  While the survey focused on participants’ early career 
trajectories, it also asked questions about participants’ families, background, and education, 
including questions about the education of both parents. Id. at 17–20. 
 25. See, e.g., Richard H. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, 88 DENV. U. L. 
REV. 631, 633 (2011). 
 26. The first wave of AJD data showed that very few individuals from poor and 
disadvantaged backgrounds were attending law school at all. Joyce Sterling et al., The 
Changing Social Role of Urban Law Schools, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 389, 405 (2007).  The 
overwhelming majority of law students, and particularly students at the most prestigious 
schools, came from relatively privileged backgrounds. Sander, supra note 25, at 632 (“The 
vast majority of American law students come from relatively elite backgrounds; this is 
especially true at the most prestigious law schools, where only five percent of all students 
come from families whose [socioeconomic score] is in the bottom half of the national 
distribution.”).  The AJD data also established a correlation between father’s educational 
attainment and law school attended, see Sterling et al., supra, at 404, and between law school 
attended and the subsequent practice setting in which a lawyer worked.  While a majority of 
elite law school graduates went into practice in large corporate firms, only 15 percent of 
graduates of nonelite schools worked in firms of over 100 lawyers. Id. at 406.  A substantial 
portion of those graduates worked in solo or small-firm practice. Id. at 405.  Independent of 
law school attended, Sterling and her colleagues also established a correlation between 
socioeconomic status and practice setting. Id. at 409.  Rebecca Sandefur, one of the authors 
on the updated Chicago study, drew similar conclusions from the AJD data. Sandefur, supra 
note 18, at 547. 
 27. See generally David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REV. 468 
(1990) [hereinafter Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers]; David B. Wilkins, Making Context 
Count:  Regulating Lawyers After Kaye, Scholer, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1145 (1993) 
[hereinafter Wilkins, Making Context Count]; David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate 
Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1992) [hereinafter Wilkins, Who Should Regulate 
Lawyers?]. 
 28. Wilkins referred to these rules as “middle-level rules” to clarify that he was not 
advocating a contextual approach taken to an extreme—with each case taken entirely on its 
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Wilkins’ lead, they proposed rules and enforcement mechanisms tailored to 
particular practice areas and client types.29 
Today, scholars of the legal profession are proposing to account for the 
profession’s two-tiered structure in a new way.  Two groups of scholars—
albeit with very different goals and motivations—are proposing to address 
the growing stratification of the legal profession through efforts to loosen, 
rather than tighten, regulation. 
The first group is focused on problems of unmet legal needs in the 
professional-services hemisphere.30  Reasoning that some legal services are 
better than none, and that many of the needed services are simple and 
routine, these scholars propose relaxation of the unauthorized practice of 
law rules.31  Early proponents argued for the lay provision of legal 
services.32  Today, most proponents support a limited licensing scheme.  
Much like a program recently adopted in the state of Washington,33 
 
own facts and circumstances.  Instead, he was proposing a “a set of ‘middle-level’ principles 
that both isolate and respond to relevant differences in social and institutional context while 
providing a structural foundation for widespread compliance in the areas where they apply.” 
Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, supra note 27, at 516. 
 29. See Roberta K. Flowers, A Code of Their Own:  Updating the Ethics Codes To 
Include the Non-adversarial Roles of Federal Prosecutors, 37 B.C. L. REV. 923 (1996); 
Bernard P. Ingold, An Overview and Analysis of the New Rules of Professional Conduct for 
Army Lawyers, 124 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1989); David J. Moraine, Loyalty Divided:  Duties to 
Clients and Duties to Others—The Civil Liability of Tax Attorneys Made Possible by the 
Acceptance of a Duty to the System, 63 TAX LAW. 169 (2009); Scott R. Peppet, Lawyers’ 
Bargaining Ethics, Contract, and Collaboration:  The End of the Legal Profession and the 
Beginning of Professional Pluralism, 90 IOWA L. REV. 475, 513 (2005); Nancy B. Rapoport, 
Our House, Our Rules:  The Need for a Uniform Code of Bankruptcy Ethics, 6 AM. BANKR. 
INST. L. REV. 45 (1998); Stanley Sporkin, The Need for Separate Codes of Professional 
Conduct for the Various Specialties, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 149 (1993); see also Acad. of 
Fam. Mediators, Standards of Practice for Family and Divorce Mediation, in CODES OF 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (Rena A. Gorlin ed., 3d ed. 1994); Am. Arb. Ass’n, The 
Code of Ethics for Arbitrators, in CODES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra. 
 30. See, e.g., Quintin Johnstone, An Overview of the Legal Profession in the United 
States, How That Profession Recently Has Been Changing, and Its Future Prospects, 26 
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 737, 770–71 (2008); Deborah Rhode, Access to Justice:  Connecting 
Principles to Practice, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 369, 371–72 (2004). 
 31. See, e.g., Benjamin H. Barton, Why Do We Regulate Lawyers?:  An Economic 
Analysis of the Justifications for Entry and Conduct Regulation, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 429, 457 
(2001); Barlow F. Christensen, The Unauthorized Practice of Law:  Do Good Fences Really 
Make Good Neighbors—or Even Good Sense?, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 159, 209–12; 
Roger C. Cramton, Delivery of Legal Services to Ordinary Americans, 44 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 531, 615 (1994); George C. Leef, Lawyer Fees Too High?  The Case for Repealing 
Unauthorized Practice of Law Statutes, REGULATION, Winter 1997, at 33; Rhode, supra note 
30, at 410; Deborah L. Rhode, Professionalism in Perspective:  Alternative Approaches to 
Nonlawyer Practice, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 701, 709–13 (1996); Christina L. 
Underwood, Balancing Consumer Interest in a Digital Age:  A New Approach to Regulating 
the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 79 WASH. L. REV. 437, 442 (2004). 
 32. See, e,g., Deborah Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly:  A Constitutional 
and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1, 38 
(1981). 
 33. In June 2012, the State of Washington, through its supreme court, approved and 
adopted regulations for “Limited License Legal Technicians.” Order at 1, In re Adoption of 
New APR 28—Limited Practice Rule for Limited License Legal Technicians, No. 25700-A-
1005 (Wash. June 15, 2012), available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/
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individuals with some training but not a full law degree would be able to 
register with the state to perform specified, routine tasks.34  Proponents 
contend that either change would increase competition, decrease prices, and 
make legal services more accessible to all segments of the population.  
Noting an absence of empirical evidence that lay providers or limited 
license providers would harm either individual consumers or the public at 
large, they argue that the downsides would be minimal.35 
The second group of scholars focuses on the corporate hemisphere.  
Observing that most corporate clients are sophisticated consumers of legal 
services who do not suffer from significant information asymmetries, these 
scholars argue that corporate clients should be afforded greater autonomy, 
flexibility, and choice than the profession’s codes of conduct permit.36  
They therefore propose that sophisticated corporate clients be permitted to 
contract around the protections of the ethical codes.  They bolster their 
argument by noting that, as compared to individual clients, corporate clients 
are less likely to suffer irreversible harm as a result of incompetent 
lawyering and more likely to be compensated adequately by money 
damages in malpractice suits.37  Their proposals are not without precedent.  
 
Press%20Releases/25700-A-1005.pdf.  The Washington technicians are permitted, among 
several other things, to investigate factual issues and explain their relevance to clients, 
inform clients about legal procedures and deadlines, and review documents received by 
clients from opposing counsel and explain their impact. See id. at 15–16.  But the technicians 
may neither represent clients in proceedings nor negotiate on their behalf. See id. at 18–19.  
Washington is the only state to have adopted this type of scheme, but other states are also 
actively exploring this option. See Wallace B. Jefferson, Liberty and Justice for Some:  How 
the Legal System Falls Short in Protecting Basic Rights, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1953, 1976–77 
(2013). 
 34. See Rhode, supra note 30, at 409; see also David Barnhizer, Profession Deleted:  
Using Market and Liability Forces To Regulate the Very Ordinary Business of Law Practice 
for Profit, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 203, 260–61 (2004); Laurel A. Rigertas, Stratification of 
the Legal Profession:  A Debate in Need of a Public Forum, 2012 J. PROF. LAW. 79; 
Meredith Ann Munro, Note, Deregulation of the Practice of Law:  Panacea or Placebo?, 42 
HASTINGS L.J. 203, 241 (1990). 
 35. See, e.g., Herbert M. Kritzer, The Future Role of “Law Workers”:  Rethinking the 
Forms of Legal Practice and the Scope of Legal Education, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 917, 921 
(2002); Rhode, supra note 32, at 38; Rhode, supra note 31, at 709–10; see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 4 cmt. c (2000) (noting that in 
the few states that have allowed extensive nonlawyer provision of legal services, there has 
been no indication of any significant risks to consumers). 
 36. See, e.g., Audrey I. Benison, The Sophisticated Client:  A Proposal for the 
Reconciliation of Conflicts of Interest Standards for Attorneys and Accountants, 13 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 699, 733–34 (2000); John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, 
Multidisciplinary Practice and the American Legal Profession:  A Market Approach to 
Regulating the Delivery of Legal Services in the Twenty-First Century, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 
83, 90 (2000); Sarah J. Lewis, Charting the “Middle” Way:  Liberalizing Multijurisdictional 
Practice Rules for Lawyers Representing Sophisticated Clients, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
631, 636 (2009); see also David B. Wilkins, Team of Rivals? Toward a New Model of the 
Corporate Attorney-Client Relationship, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2067, 2079 n.47 (2010); cf. 
Gillian K. Hadfield, Legal Barriers to Innovation:  The Growing Economic Cost of 
Professional Control over Corporate Legal Markets, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1689, 1730–32 
(2008). 
 37. See Lewis, supra note 36, at 655; Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, supra 
note 27, at 831–32. 
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In recent years, the profession’s conflicts rules have been tailored to the 
interests of sophisticated clients, permitting advance waivers where, among 
other things, “the client is an experienced user of the legal services involved 
and is reasonably informed regarding the risk that a conflict may arise.”38 
These scholars’ context-specific approaches to regulation are based on 
the critical insight that lawyers in different practice areas with different 
clients face significantly different pressures and ethical tensions.  
Meaningful and effective regulation must acknowledge and account for the 
variation.  But there is a danger that, in focusing on what draws lawyers and 
their clients apart, it is easy to lose sight of the extent to which they are 
inextricably bound together.  All contextual approaches to regulation risk 
losing sight of these connections, but as discussed next, proposals to loosen 
regulation along the profession’s existing structural contours entail unique 
and particularly worrisome risks. 
II.  CONNECTIONS BETWEEN HEMISPHERES 
The lawyers and clients of the profession’s two hemispheres may live 
and work in different worlds, but they interact regularly.  In this Part, I 
argue that these interactions constitute a principal way in which the 
profession’s bifurcated structure reinforces inequities in society at large.  I 
also argue that existing mechanisms of professional regulation play an 
important role in countering these inequities and balancing the playing 
field.  Given this, proposals to relax professional regulation in either 
hemisphere threaten to reinforce and entrench existing inequities in the 
profession and in society at large. 
A.  Client Interactions 
The clients of the profession’s hemispheres interact with each other in 
myriad ways.  Individuals rely on corporations for the products and services 
that sustain daily life (e.g., food, shelter, transportation, and medicine) as 
well as for a host of additional products and services that improve the 
convenience and quality of life (e.g., computers, insurance, credit cards, and 
banking services).39  Corporations, for their part, actively market these 
products and services to all segments of society. 
The resulting interactions have countless legal implications, often leading 
to full-blown legal disputes.  Indeed, a majority of all court cases in the 
United States involve individual litigants on one side and corporate or 
organizational litigants on the other.40  Some are initiated by corporate 
 
 38. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 22 (2013). 
 39. Marc Galanter, Planet of the APs:  Reflections on the Scale of Law and its Users, 53 
BUFF. L. REV. 1369, 1370 (2006). 
 40. In a study of federal court litigation, Gillian Hadfield concluded that in the year 
2000, a significant majority of federal cases were between individuals on one side and 
corporate entities on the other. Gillian K. Hadfield, Exploring Economic and Democratic 
Theories of Civil Litigation:  Differences Between Individual and Organizational Litigants in 
the Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1275, 1298 (2005).  Data does not 
exist for comprehensive conclusions regarding state courts, but a 1992 study concluded that 
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clients, who pursue individuals for matters such as debt collection or 
foreclosure; others are initiated by individuals, who pursue corporate clients 
to hold them liable for harm. 
For a number of reasons, these cases are frequently resolved on an 
unbalanced playing field.  The parties themselves bring different resources 
to bear, with those of the corporate litigants generally outstripping those of 
the individuals.  Reinforcing this imbalance, the lawyers bring to bear the 
advantages and disadvantages of their respective hemispheres.41  Although 
excellent and experienced lawyers practice in both hemispheres (as do 
lesser quality and inexperienced lawyers), those practicing in the corporate 
hemisphere are often backed by greater power, wealth, and status than those 
of the personal-services hemisphere.42 
In at least three ways, this imbalance reinforces the social disparities that 
the profession’s structure reflects.  First, it leads to higher success rates for 
corporate clients in court.  Empirical studies of federal court litigation 
reveal that corporate litigants win more frequently and lose less frequently 
than individuals.43  Second, it empowers corporate clients to exert greater 
influence on the judicial agenda than individual clients.  As Marc Galanter 
describes, corporate and organizational clients “make[] courts more future-
oriented, more managerial, more utilitarian, and generally more 
‘legislative.’”44  This forward-looking, regulatory view, in turn, confers 
significant advantages on the repeat players of the corporate hemisphere, 
who can invest and plan accordingly.  Corporate litigants may also draw 
judicial attention away from smaller disputes between individuals.  Galanter 
explains, “Mirroring the prestige structure of the bar, many judges think 
 
in the seventy-five most populous counties in the country, 60 percent of civil jury trials 
involved an individual plaintiff suing an organizational defendant. CAROL J. DEFRANCES ET 
AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL JUSTICE SURVEY OF STATE COURTS, 1992:  JURY CASES AND 
VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES 3 tbl.4 (1995). 
 41. It will not be in every matter that the lawyers on both sides of a case—even a case 
involving an individual on one side and an organization on the other—will come from 
different hemispheres.  In many instances, such as run-of-the-mill landlord-tenant cases, both 
parties will be represented by the solo practitioners and smaller firms of the personal-
services hemisphere even if the landlord is formally organized as a corporate entity.  In a 
significant number of cases involving an individual litigant on one side and a corporate 
litigant on the other, however, the opposing lawyers will, in fact, come from the two 
different hemispheres. 
 42. Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law:  How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the 
Justice System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953, 998 (2000) (“[T]he market for lawyers . . . 
overwhelmingly allocates legal resources to clients with interests backed by corporate 
aggregations of wealth.”). 
 43. Galanter, supra note 39, at 1389–90 (citing Terence Dunworth & Joel Rogers, 
Corporations in Court:  Big Business Litigation in U.S. Federal Courts, 1971–1991, 21 LAW 
& SOC. INQUIRY 497, 557 (1996)); see also Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do 
Case Outcomes Really Reveal Anything About the Legal System?  Win Rates and Removal 
Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 581, 605 tbl.5 (1998); Theodore Eisenberg & Henry S. 
Farber, The Litigious Plaintiff Hypothesis:  Case Selection and Resolution, 28 RAND J. ECON. 
S92, S103 tbl.2 (1997); Hadfield, supra note 40.  That a vast majority of cases settle out of 
court does not diminish the significance of these in-court win/loss rates, as cases settle in the 
shadow of litigation. 
 44. Galanter, supra note 39, at 1400–01. 
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that big dollar commercial cases are what properly deserve the attention of 
courts and the routine matters of individuals are ‘junk cases’ that should be 
addressed elsewhere.”45 
Third and relatedly, the imbalanced playing field affords corporate 
parties enhanced power to shape the substantive law.  Backed by the 
lawyers and resources of the corporate hemisphere, corporate clients can 
engage in legislative and litigation-reform campaigns, often with success.  
Examples include efforts to limit the availability of punitive damages46 and 
to exclude certain classes of individual claims from court, subjecting them 
to binding arbitration instead.47 
In the aggregate, interactions between the clients of the two hemispheres 
match lawyers of greater resources, power, and prestige (representing 
corporate clients) against lawyers of lesser resources, power, and prestige 
(representing individual clients).  More often than not, the corporate clients 
emerge victorious, ensuring in yet another way that the profession’s 
bifurcated structure reinforces the social stratification it reflects.48 
B.  Loosening Professional Regulation 
As just described, structural imbalances between the profession’s 
hemispheres have troubling implications for the equity of our legal system.  
The situation would be far worse, however, without the protections of 
professional regulation—if, for example, we loosened or eliminated them 
pursuant to many scholars’ proposals. 
1.  Relaxing Regulation in the Personal-Services Hemisphere 
The foundational purpose of professional licensure is to ensure the 
quality and competency of professional services.  The legal profession 
pursues these goals in a number of ways—by requiring law school training, 
bar passage, and continuing legal education; and by conditioning conduct 
through character and fitness requirements and ethical codes backed by the 
threat of license revocation.49  The profession’s system of licensure and 
regulation is not nearly as effective as we would like it to be, but it does 
 
 45. Id. at 1405. 
 46. See, e.g., id. at 1398 (citing STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND 
THE POLITICS OF REFORM (1995)); Michael L. Rustad, The Closing of Punitive Damages’ 
Iron Cage, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1297, 1368 (2005) (“Tort reform in the states is a victory of 
the ‘haves’ over the ‘have-nots’ achieved through a disinformation campaign whose 
watchword is tort reform.”); see also Lauren B. Edelman & Mark C. Suchman, When the 
“Haves” Hold Court:  Speculations on the Organizational Internalization of Law, 33 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 941, 941–42 (1999). 
 47. See Bryant G. Garth, Tilting the Justice System:  From ADR As Idealistic Movement 
to a Segmented Market in Dispute Resolution, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 972, 930, 932 (2002). 
 48. See supra notes 44–47 and accompanying text. 
 49. See Joseph R. Julin, The Legal Profession:  Education and Entry, in REGULATING 
THE PROFESSIONS, A PUBLIC-POLICY SYMPOSIUM 201, 204 (Roger D. Blair & Stephen Rubin 
eds., 1980); Alan D. Wolfson et al., Regulating the Profession:  A Theoretical Framework, 
in OCCUPATIONAL LICENSURE AND REGULATION 180, 190–200 (Simon Rothenberg ed., 
1980). 
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ensure baseline levels of knowledge, training, and competence among all 
lawyers.50 
If licensure were eliminated as a requirement for providing legal services, 
it is not likely that the quality or cost of legal services would change 
significantly at the top of the market.51  Wealthy clients will always be 
willing and able to pay a premium for the best legal services available.  
Even if entry barriers were relaxed, therefore, it is not likely that new 
entrants would compete with or displace established large-firm lawyers.52  
It is similarly unlikely that competition from lower quality service providers 
would exert greater downward pressure on fees than already exists from 
significant competition for clients among large firms. 
In the personal-services hemisphere, however, the entry of new low-cost 
legal services would entail different ramifications.  While it may or may not 
decrease cost for clients,53 it would certainly decrease quality and 
competency.  Already, the risk of harm from incompetent legal services is 
more significant in the personal-services hemisphere because of significant 
information asymmetries.  In stark contrast to sophisticated corporate 
clients (who are well equipped to make informed decisions about the use 
and selection of legal services), individuals and small businesses frequently 
lack the knowledge, resources, and connections to evaluate lawyers’ skills 
and qualifications.54  There is a distinct risk, therefore, that if licensure were 
eliminated, clients and potential clients of the personal-services hemisphere 
would choose service providers based on cost alone, creating a race to the 
bottom.55 
Many clients of the personal-services hemisphere are also ill equipped to 
monitor their lawyers’ work and, where appropriate, to hold their lawyers 
accountable for harm.  Many lack the expertise to discern whether a mistake 
is actionable and the resources to pursue a malpractice claim.56 
On top of that, the extent of harm suffered by individuals who receive 
incompetent legal services tends to far outweigh that suffered by corporate 
clients.  Unlike large and sophisticated corporate entities, individuals and 
 
 50. Barton, supra note 31, at 430. 
 51. Benjamin H. Barton, Economists on Deregulation of the American Legal Profession:  
Praise and Critique, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 493, 509–10. 
 52. Id. at 510. 
 53. But see Munro, supra note 34, at 229 (questioning whether deregulation will cause 
prices to fall, even at the low end of the market). 
 54. Elizabeth Michelman, Guiding the Invisible Hand:  The Consumer Protection 
Function of Unauthorized Practice Regulation, 12 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 21–22 & n.75 (1984); cf. 
Barton, supra note 31, at 440 (conceding information asymmetries are a major problem for 
such clients, but contending economic justifications nevertheless do not support entry 
barriers). 
 55. Rhode, supra note 31, at 710; see also Cramton, supra note 31, at 545–46 
(“[P]roducers will not be compensated for the higher cost of high-quality service . . . 
result[ing] in a ‘market for lemon’ because producers are forced to make price and quality 
reductions that lead to the sale of only cheap products or low-quality service and the market 
shrinking.”). 
 56. Rhode, supra note 31, at 710; see also Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 
supra note 27, at 829, 831. 
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small businesses cannot afford to treat judgments against them as mere 
“speeding tickets.”57  A criminal defendant may forfeit her freedom because 
of bad lawyering.58  A private client or small business may face financial 
ruin as a result of bad counseling, poor transactional work, or inadequate 
representation in litigation.59  A deserving plaintiff may be unable to 
receive a just and full remedy for her injuries because of poor or unethical 
lawyering. 
Proponents of deregulation contend that these risks and harms will not 
worsen if lay providers are permitted to provide legal services.60  They 
emphasize that many legal transactions are routine, discrete, and easy to 
perform competently, and they claim that some legal services are better than 
none.61  But it is often impossible to know in advance whether a 
bankruptcy, divorce, or other legal interaction will be simple and 
straightforward, or whether it will implicate hidden and complicated legal 
issues.  Lay providers, who lack training in the analytical skills of 
lawyering, are far less likely to spot and manage these issues and to 
minimize the accompanying risks.62 
Even if professional licensure at the bottom of the market is replaced by a 
limited licensing scheme (rather than entirely eliminated), these problems 
will persist.  By ensuring some training and offering recourse for harmed 
consumers, a limited licensing scheme could address many of the more 
extreme problems of incompetent and unethical providers posed by 
complete deregulation.63  But it would institutionalize a two-class 
profession, in which higher-quality and better-educated lawyers are 
available to the wealthier segments of society, while lower-quality legal 
technicians serve the poorer segments.  Like proposals to deregulate, 
limited licensing schemes would therefore create greater imbalance in 
interactions between the clients of the profession’s two hemispheres.  
 
 57. Cf. George M. Cohen, Posnerian Jurisprudence and Economic Analysis of Law:  
The View from the Bench, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1119 n.6 (1985) (explaining the 
“tradeoff” analysis completed by a motorist when weighing his ability to pay for a speeding 
ticket against how much he chooses to speed). 
 58. See Cramton, supra note 31, at 554–55; see also Barton, supra note 31, at 440 
(“[S]ome potential harms, notably those involved in criminal defense work, are potentially 
irremediable and may justify regulation.”). 
 59. BARLOW F. CHRISTENSEN, LAWYERS FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE MEANS 48 (1970) 
(“[T]he resolution of such questions may be far more important to the poor person or the 
person of moderate means than the actual economic value of the case.”); cf. Andrew F. 
Moore, Fraud, the Unauthorized Practice of Law and Unmet Legal Needs:  A Look at State 
Laws Regulating Immigration Assistants, 19 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 5–8 (2004). 
 60. See, e.g., Rhode, supra note 31, at 708–09. 
 61. See, e.g., Mary Helen McNeal, Having One Oar or Being Without a Boat:  
Reflections on the Fordham Recommendations on Limited Legal Assistance, 67 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2617, 2618 (1999). 
 62. Cf. Kritzer, supra note 35, at 927 (explaining that the distinction between his new 
categories of legal service providers turns on the need for creativity in thinking about the 
law—“thus, the distinction between the legal processor and the legal consultant might be 
summed up by whether or not their cases call for what is sometimes labeled ‘creative 
lawyering’”). 
 63. See Rhode, supra note 30, at 409. 
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Represented by the highest quality lawyers and facing individuals with 
lawyers or lay providers of declining quality, corporate litigants would 
achieve even greater rates of success in court.  They would exert even 
greater influence on judicial agendas and substantive law, and they would 
“play for the rules” even more so than they already do.64  The interactions 
that link the two hemispheres together would therefore have the ironic 
effect of pushing them even further apart. 
2.  Relaxing Regulation in the Corporate Hemisphere 
In the corporate hemisphere, mechanisms of professional regulation 
combat the hemispheres’ structural inequities in a different but equally 
important way—by bolstering professional independence from clients.  The 
profession’s codes of conduct do so by requiring lawyers to balance duties 
to clients with baseline duties to opponents, third parties, courts, and the 
general public.  They prohibit a lawyer from engaging in certain conduct 
that corporate management might otherwise direct, such as interviewing 
corporate constituents without sufficient disclosures65 and communicating 
directly with employees and third parties who are represented by separate 
counsel.66  They impose affirmative duties on a lawyer to report corporate 
wrongdoing up the ladder to the board of directors.67  These and other rules 
also stand as important justifications for lawyers to exercise their 
independent judgment in serving clients’ interests in ways that comport 
with the fairness and equity of the legal system—not only (or necessarily) 
because they want to, but also because they may otherwise lose their 
license. 
Without the protections of professional regulation in the corporate 
hemisphere, the dangers of insufficient professional independence, long 
noted by scholars,68 would be fully realized.  There would be little to stop 
sophisticated corporate actors from co-opting lawyers into facilitating 
excessively aggressive or unethical business schemes.69  At least some 
lawyers would engage in legal strategies and tactics that, while highly 
 
 64. See generally Marc Galanter, Why the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead:  Speculations on 
the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974). 
 65. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmt. 10 (2013) (requiring clarification 
that the lawyer represents the corporation and that the constituent may seek independent 
counsel). 
 66. Id. R. 4.2 (requiring a lawyer to communicate only with the lawyer of a represented 
individual). 
 67. Corporate counsel has a duty under section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and 
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.13 to report corporate misconduct and wrongdoing 
“up the ladder” and eventually to the board of directors. Roger C. Cramton, George M. 
Cohen & Susan P. Kroniak, Legal and Ethical Duties of Lawyers After Sarbanes-Oxley, 49 
VILL. L. REV. 725, 739–41 (2004). 
 68. See, e.g., Susanna M. Kim, Dual Identities and Dueling Obligations:  Preserving 
Independence in Corporate Representation, 68 TENN. L. REV. 179, 253 (2001); Robert Eli 
Rosen, Problem-Setting and Serving the Organizational Client:  Legal Diagnosis and 
Professional Independence, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 179, 184 (2001). 
 69. Dana Remus, Out of Practice:  The Twenty-First Century Legal Profession, 63 
DUKE L.J. 1243, 1263–73 (2014). 
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beneficial to their clients, would be harmful to society at large.  For 
example, they might advise clients on ways of circumventing safety or 
environmental regulations that follow the text but not the spirit of the law, 
or recommend questionable tax strategies that would likely avoid 
detection.70  Even worse, some lawyers might enable illegal and destructive 
behavior, as lawyers did in recent corporate scandals, such as Enron and 
KPMG.71 
These examples highlight that it is not only in litigation practice, but also 
in counseling and transactional work, that the lawyers of one hemisphere 
can have significant and often harmful influence on the clients of the other.  
When corporate lawyers insert binding arbitration clauses in consumer 
contracts, it is individuals of the personal-services hemisphere who are 
excluded from court.  When corporate lawyers help their clients evade tax 
liability, it is the public fisc that suffers.  And as one corporate scandal after 
another has shown,72 when corporate lawyers facilitate their clients’ 
excessively risky profit-maximizing strategies, it is the public at large that 
pays the price.73  The protections of professional regulation are critical in 
these and countless other situations, not to protect clients from their 
lawyers, but to protect third parties, the public, and lawyers themselves 
from problematic ways in which savvy corporate clients can use their 
lawyers. 
A loosening of professional regulation in either of the profession’s 
hemispheres would therefore threaten harm to the integrity of the legal 
system as a whole.  In the corporate hemisphere, it would allow savvy 
clients to manipulate their lawyers to unfair, unethical, or even illegal ends.  
In the personal-services hemisphere, it would depress the quality of legal 
services and perversely entrench existing and deep-seated inequities in the 
profession and in society at large. 
We cannot, and perhaps should not, control fully for some disparities, 
such as the amount of resources individuals and entities have or choose to 
spend on legal matters.74  But we can ensure a base level of competence, 
 
 70. Barton, supra note 31, at 474. 
 71. Remus, supra note 69, at 1243, 1273. 
 72. See Alexi Barrionuevo, Two Enron Chiefs Are Convicted in Fraud and Conspiracy 
Trial, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2006, at A1; Corporate America’s Woes, Continued, 
ECONOMIST, Nov. 30, 2002, at 59; Andrew Ross Sorkin & Alex Berenson, Tyco Admits 
Using Accounting Tactics To Inflate Earnings, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2002, at A1; Ken 
Belson, Adelphia Proposes To Settle Federal Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2004), 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A07E5D81639F93AA15751C1A9629C8B
63; Simon Romero & Alex Berenson, WorldCom Says It Hid Expenses, Inflating Cash Flow 
$3.8 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/26/business/
worldcom-says-it-hid-expenses-inflating-cash-flow-3.8-billion.html. 
 73. See, e.g., Milton C. Regan, Jr., Teaching Enron, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1139, 1154–
55 (2005) (describing the role of in-house and outside counsel in the Enron scandal); Zach 
Lowe, Lawyer To Serve Six-and-a-Half Years in KPMG Tax Fraud Case, AM. L. DAILY 
(Apr. 2, 2009, 11:30 AM), http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2009/04/kpmg-
lawyer.html. 
 74. Rhode, supra note 30, at 373 (“Although there is broad agreement that the quality of 
justice should not depend on the ability to pay, there is little corresponding consensus on an 
alternative.  How do we deal with disparities in incentives, resources, and legal ability?  True 
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conduct, and independence among all lawyers.  That our current system of 
professional regulation is not doing an adequate job is reason not to 
abandon it, but to improve it.  In the next and final Part, I offer preliminary 
thoughts on how we might do so. 
III.  THE PATH AHEAD 
To be effective, professional regulation must account not only for the 
differences and distance between the profession’s two hemispheres, but also 
for the interactions that link them together.  As discussed, these interactions 
are frequently characterized by significant power and wealth disparities that 
skew the playing field in and out of court.  In this Part, I propose that the 
profession address these imbalances by moving beyond existing reform 
proposals and thinking creatively about new ways to target the principal 
problems of each hemisphere—the need for increased access and 
competency in the personal-services hemisphere and increased 
independence in the corporate hemisphere.  After outlining the broad 
contours of reform, I briefly note a few proposals deserving of extended 
study. 
In the personal-services hemisphere, the principal challenge is not just 
access, but access to competent services.  Reform efforts should therefore 
aim to draw a greater number of qualified and competent lawyers into 
practice settings and areas that serve individuals.  Given that the principal 
deterrent is low incomes, a central goal should be increasing funds to 
support legal aid and public-interest organizations.  This could be 
accomplished through a new tax on law firm profits or through a new 
requirement that all licensed lawyers pay an annual sum to fund low-
income lawyering.  Given the number of licensed lawyers in the country, a 
requirement of even a single average billable hour could raise significant 
funds (if implemented in all states).  Highly competent lawyers could also 
be drawn into the lower-income practice areas of the personal-services 
hemisphere through improved and expanded loan repayment programs.75 
In the corporate hemisphere, the principal challenge is to bolster lawyers’ 
independence from their clients.  Reform efforts should therefore aim to 
 
equality in legal assistance would presumably require not only massive public expenditures 
but also the restriction of private expenditures.”). 
 75. Expanded loan repayment programs could incentivize entry into the lower income 
practice areas of the personal-services hemisphere.  Currently, the federal government and 
twenty-four states have variations of these programs. See 20 U.S.C. § 1087ee (2012) 
(codifying provisions for the Federal Perkins Loan, which includes a public-service 
loan forgiveness provision); State Loan Repayment Assistance Programs, A.B.A., 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/initiatives/loan_repayme
nt_assistance_programs/state_loan_repayment_assistance_programs.html (last visited Apr. 
26, 2014).  But many offer very limited repayment.  Recently, the ABA concluded that 
although the number of these programs has begun to increase, most of them “still do not 
meet most of the need of many attorneys who would like to work in the public interest.” 
Loan Repayment Assistance Programs, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_
aid_indigent_defendants/initiatives/loan_repayment_assistance_programs.html (last updated 
Sept. 21, 2012).  States that do not have these programs should establish them, and existing 
programs should be expanded and publicized to gain additional support. 
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protect third parties, the public, and lawyers themselves from the ways in 
which clients can manipulate and use lawyers to facilitate problematic ends.  
New conduct rules could, for example, impose heightened reporting 
requirements and corresponding exceptions to the confidentiality rules. 
A more drastic set of reforms targeted at heightened professional 
independence would acknowledge and account for the different pressures 
lawyers feel in different work settings.  The independence of in-house 
counsel, for example, is inherently undermined by the reality that the client 
is also the employer.76  One way to account for this would be to impose 
different obligations and protections on lawyers who employ themselves as 
opposed to those who are employed by their client.77 
The goals of increased competency and access in the personal-services 
hemisphere and increased independence in the corporate hemisphere 
interrelate in important ways.  Competent lawyers serving individuals can 
police the independence of corporate lawyers by challenging and 
uncovering corporate wrongdoing that implicates or co-opts lawyers’ 
services.  Successful class-action attorneys can be particularly effective in 
this regard.78  Independent corporate lawyers, for their part, can ameliorate 
the need for this type of policing by counseling corporate clients to follow 
the spirit as well as the letter of the law. 
Independent corporate lawyers can also bolster access to competent 
services in the personal-services hemisphere by increasing both awareness 
and supply.  By complying with their duties to advise corporate constituents 
to secure separate counsel79 and by refraining from giving an impression of 
disinterestedness to unrepresented parties,80 corporate lawyers can help 
individuals recognize when they have a legal issue with which a lawyer 
could help.  Moreover, independent corporate lawyers are more likely to 
recognize and honor their duties to the state and society as well as to private 
clients—duties that require heightened efforts to represent underserved 
populations through pro bono and public interest work.  When corporate 
lawyers comply with these duties by offering pro bono services to 
 
 76. In-house lawyers may become so involved in management’s decisionmaking and so 
enmeshed in the corporate culture that their perspective becomes entirely aligned with 
corporate management, precluding the possibility of independent judgment. Deborah A. 
DeMott, The Discrete Roles of General Counsel, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 955, 967–69 (2005). 
 77. A useful though inexact analogy is England’s bifurcated structure of barristers and 
solicitors.  One of the primary justifications for that structure is that barristers, who have 
minimal contact with their clients (since everything proceeds through the solicitor) can offer 
a more independent opinion, free from direct pressures from a client. Judith L. Maute, 
Revolutionary Changes to the English Legal Profession or Much Ado About Nothing?, 17 
PROF. LAW., no. 4, 2006, at 1, 4. 
 78. See Adam S. Zimmerman & David M. Jaros, The Criminal Class Action, 159 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1385, 1416 (2011) (“[C]lass action rules were designed, in part, to ensure that 
individuals who enforce the law as ‘private attorneys general’ do so in the public interest.”). 
 79. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2013) (requiring clarification that the 
lawyer represents the corporation and that the constituent should seek independent counsel). 
 80. Id. R. 4.3 (requiring a lawyer to refrain from giving an impression of 
disinterestedness when interacting with an unrepresented party). 
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individuals, they take important steps in addressing the insufficient supply 
of lawyers in the personal-services hemisphere. 
No single reform or strategy will provide a quick fix for the pernicious 
effects of the profession’s structural imbalances.  But by pursuing multiple 
strategies at once with the goals of increasing access, competency, and 
professional independence, the profession can decrease wealth and power 
disparities between the lawyers and clients of the two hemispheres and 
work towards a more level playing field in and out of court. 
CONCLUSION 
Legal scholars have long sought to account for the structure of the legal 
profession in their regulatory proposals.  They have generally done so by 
accepting the existence of the profession’s two hemispheres and by treating 
each as a domain unto itself.  I have argued that effective ethical regulation 
must account for the profession’s structure in a much broader way—by 
seeking to understand the system-wide implications of its bifurcated 
structure.  Understanding these implications, in turn, requires attention not 
just to the distance and differentiation between the profession’s 
hemispheres but to the client connections that bind them together. 
Tending to these connections reveals a critical way in which the stratified 
lawyers of the profession’s hemispheres participate in reproducing the 
power disparities that they reflect.  It also reveals that successful efforts to 
address inequitable access to legal services will have to address disparities 
between the profession’s hemispheres.  A critical starting point will be to 
increase competency and access in the personal-services hemisphere and 
independence in the corporate hemisphere. 
 
